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Abstract
Recently Bramoulle and Kranton [2] presented a model for the provision of public goods over a network
and showed the existence of a class of Nash equilibria called specialized equilibria wherein some agents
exert maximum effort while other agents free ride. We examine the efficiency, effort and cost of special-
ized equilibria in comparison to other equilibria. Our main results show that the welfare of a particular
specialized equilibrium approaches the maximum welfare amongst all equilibria as the concavity of the
benefit function tends to unity. For forest networks a similar result also holds as the concavity approaches
zero. Moreover, without any such concavity conditions, there exists for any network a specialized equi-
librium that requires the maximum weighted effort amongst all equilibria. When the network is a forest,
a specialized equilibrium also incurs the minimum total cost amongst all equilibria. For well-covered
forest networks we show that all welfare maximizing equilibria are specialized and all equilibria incur
the same total cost. Thus we argue that specialized equilibria may be considered as a refinement of
the equilibrium of the public goods game. We show several results on the structure and efficiency of
equilibria that highlight the role of dependants in the network.
1 Introduction
Recently, Bramoulle and Kranton [2] introduced a model for studying the incentives of agents for the
provision of non-excludable public goods in the presence of a network amongst the agents. In their
model, agents benefit from their own effort and also from the collective effort of their neighbours in the
network, according to a monotone concave benefit function. Since effort is costly, agents choose their
effort levels based on the efforts by their neighbours. In fact, some agents may choose to free ride, i.e.,
exert no effort, if the cumulative effort of their neighbours is such that marginal cost of their effort
is higher than its marginal benefit. At a Nash equilibrium [6] of the resulting game, no agent has an
incentive to unilaterally deviate from its effort level. Such a model, as the authors describe, is suitable
to study the incentives for companies to invest in innovation and research, in the presence of a network
of companies.
Bramoulle and Kranton [2] considered three classes of equilibria. In a specialized equilibrium, some
agents exert maximum effort (effort they would exert in the absence of a network) and all other agents
free ride. Equilibria where all agents exert a positive effort are called distributed equilibria and equilibria
which are neither specialized nor distributed are referred to as hybrid equilibria. Bramoulle and Kranton
showed that there may not exist an efficient equilibrium, i.e., a profile of efforts in equilibrium may not
correspond to that which maximizes social welfare. Hence it is relevant to compare only equilibrium
profiles based on their welfare and ask which equilibria yield maximum welfare.
Recall that for a class of games G the Nash equilibrium may be thought of as a set-valued function
that prescribes a set of strategy profiles, NE(G), for each game in G ∈ G. A refinement of the Nash
equilibrium is another set-valued function which prescribes for each G ∈ G a subset of strategy profiles,
R(G) ⊆ NE(G), with the property that, for any G ∈ G, R(G) is nonempty if NE(G) is nonempty,
and that there is some G ∈ G such that R(G) 6= NE(G). Refined equilibria have additional properties
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specified by the mapping R and may be regarded as being more attractive for consideration as a solution
concept. Bramoulle and Kranton [2] showed that specialized equilibria always exist, and under certain
conditions, they have the property of stability under best response dynamics and hence may be considered
as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium of the public goods game. However, it is not clear how these
equilibria rank under the criterion of maximum equilibrium welfare and whether they lead to maximum
total equilibrium effort or minimum total equilibrium cost. More generally, it is of interest to understand
how the nature of the network affects the structure and efficiency of equilibria of a public goods game.
The present paper is born out of the observation that answers to these questions are within reach
from our previous work in graph theory [7]. It was shown in [2] that specialized equilibria are in a
one-to-one correspondence with maximal independent sets of the network. While in [7], we provided new
characterizations of the cardinality of the largest and the smallest maximal independent set in a graph.
Building on this characterization, in this paper, we show that specialized equilibria may be considered
as a refinement of the equilibrium of a public goods game under certain broad assumptions and criteria.
Our first result shows that under certain assumptions on the concavity of the benefit function, there
exist specialized equilibria which attain the maximum welfare amongst all equilibria. Specifically, there
is a particular specialized equilibrium with the property that as the concavity approaches unity, the
welfare under this equilibrium comes arbitrarily close to the maximum equilibrium welfare. If the graph
is a forest, a similar result holds even as the concavity approaches zero. Moreover, for a class of networks
called well-covered forests [8], we show that for any benefit function, all welfare maximizing equilibria
are necessarily specialized. A well-covered forest is a graph without cycles and isolated vertices wherein
every vertex is either adjacent to exactly one other vertex, or has exactly one neighbour that possesses
this property.
Next, considering the total weighted effort as the criterion for comparing equilibria, we show that for
any benefit function, there exist specialized equilibria that maximize the total weighted effort amongst all
equilibria. Hence specialized equilibria may be considered as a refinement of the equilibrium of a public
goods game by the criterion of total weighted effort, and also by the criterion of welfare under certain
assumptions on the concavity of the benefit function. Surprisingly, analogous results do not hold for the
criterion of minimum total cost, or minimum total effort – in general hybrid or distributed equilibria
may lead to the least total cost. In fact, in regular networks distributed equilibria form a refinement
of the equilibrium under the criterion of minimum total cost. However, if the network is a forest, we
find that there is a specialized equilibrium that attains the minimum total equilibrium cost. Once again,
well-covered forest networks have an interesting property – all equilibria on such networks require the
same total effort.
Additionally, we derive results relating the nature of equilibria and their efficiency to the structure of
the underlying network of agents. We have found that the absence of cycles (i.e., forest networks) and
the presence of dependants, i.e., agents having only one neighbour, is an important characteristic of the
network in this regard. These results may have sociological interpretations and may be of independent
interest.
The following section introduces the model and formally states the main results of this paper.
1.1 Model, terminology and main results
Let the graph G = (V,E) be a network with agents represented by vertices V = {1, . . . , n}, and with
links E representing pairwise connectivity between the agents, be it geographical, economic or social [2].
We first recall some terminology pertaining to graphs. Two vertices i, j ∈ V are said to be adjacent if
there exists an link (i, j) ∈ E between them. Adjacent agents are also called neighbours. An independent
set of a graph is a set of pairwise nonadjacent vertices. An independent set is said to be maximal if it is
not a subset of a larger independent set. An independent set with the largest number of vertices is called
a maximum independent set. The cardinality of a maximum independent set is called the independence
number and is denoted by α(G). It is easy to see that a maximum independent set is maximal, but
the converse is not true. A generalization of the independence number is the w-weighted independence
number for a vector1 of weights w = (w1, . . . , wn)>, wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V . Define the weight of a set S ⊆ V
as
∑
i∈S wi. The w-weighted independence number αw(G) is the maximum weight among the weights
of all independent sets, and the independent set with the maximum weight is called the w-weighted
maximum independent set. Clearly αe(G) is the independence number of G, where e := (1, 1, . . . , 1)> is
the vector of all 1’s.
1All vectors are column vectors unless mentioned otherwise.
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A path between vertices i and j is a collection of distinct links (y1, z1), . . . , (yk, zk) such that y1 =
i, zk = j and zt = yt+1 for all 1 ≤ t < k. Recall that a graph is said to be connected if there is a path
between every pair vertices. A path that starts and ends at the same vertex is called a cycle. A forest
is a graph without cycles. A connected forest is called a tree.
We now come back to the model for the game. Let every agent i ∈ V exert an effort xi ≥ 0 with a
constant marginal cost c. We call the vector x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)> as the profile of efforts. Let b : R→ R
be a differentiable concave monotone benefit function, i.e., b′(y) > 0, b′′(y) < 0 for all y ∈ R, y ≥ 0.
Moreover let b′(e∗) = c, for some e∗ > 0. In the absence of the network, an agent benefits b(xi) on
exerting an effort xi, which costs cxi, whereby the utility of agent i is U soloi = b(xi) − cxi. This utility
is maximum for a unique effort level e∗, since b is an increasing concave function, which by definition,
satisfies ∂U
solo
i
∂xi
(e∗) = 0.
Due to presence of the network, however, an agent i benefits from the collective efforts exerted by
itself and its neighbours Ni := {j | (i, j) ∈ E}. Hence the benefit of agent i is,
b
xi + ∑
j∈Ni
xj
 = b(Ei(x)),
where,
Ei(x) := xi +
∑
j∈Ni
xj , (1)
is the effort of the closed neighbourhood of agent i. It is the cumulative effort from which agent i can
benefit. Hence the utility of agent i is
Ui(x) = b(Ei(x))− cxi. (2)
A profile of efforts x∗ is a Nash equilibrium [6] if no agent has an incentive to deviate from it unilaterally,
i.e.,
Ui(x
∗
i , x
∗
(−i)) ≥ Ui(xi, x∗(−i)), for all xi ≥ 0,
where x∗(−i) = (x
∗
1, . . . , x
∗
i−1, x
∗
i+1, . . . , x
∗
n)
>. For a public goods game over a network G, we denote by
NE(G) the set of Nash equilibrium effort profiles.
It was shown in [2], that for every Nash equilibrium x, we have 0 ≤ xi ≤ e∗. An agent i is called a free
rider if xi = 0 and a specialist if xi = e∗. An equilibrium x∗ is said to be specialized if x∗i = 0 or x∗i = e∗
for all agents i. x∗ is said to be distributed if x∗i > 0 for all agents i. We denote the set of specialized
equilibria by SNE(G) and the set of distributed equilibria by DNE(G). Bramoulle and Kranton [2] also
showed that in any specialized equilibrium, the agents exerting effort e∗ form a maximal independent
set of the graph. Conversely, every maximal independent set corresponds to a specialized equilibrium in
which the agents in the set exert effort e∗ and all other agents free ride.
Among all equilibria of a public goods game, some equilibria may be more efficient than others.
Carrying forward the discussion by Bramoulle and Kranton, we use the utilitarian definition of welfare
to compare efficiency of effort profiles. The utilitarian welfare, WU(x), is the sum of utilities of each
agent at the profile of efforts x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn)>,
WU(x) :=
∑
i∈V
Ui(x) =
∑
i∈V
b(Ei(x))− c e>x. (3)
An effort profile x is said to be efficient if WU(x) ≥ WU(y), for all other effort profiles y. It was shown
in [2] that Nash equilibria are in general not efficient.
We denote the maximum equilibrium welfare by W∗U. Similarly, for a vector of weights w ∈ Rn,
E∗w denotes the maximum w-weighted equilibrium effort and C∗ the minimum equilibrium cost. Cor-
respondingly WS∗U , E
S∗
w C
S∗ are these optimum quantities if only specialized equilibria are considered.
Formally,
W∗U = max{WU(x) | x ∈ NE(G)}, WS∗U = max{WU(x) | x ∈ SNE(G)}, (4)
E∗w = max{w>x | x ∈ NE(G)}, ES∗w = max{w>x | x ∈ SNE(G)}, (5)
C∗ = c ·min{e>x | x ∈ NE(G)}, CS∗ = c ·min{e>x | x ∈ SNE(G)}. (6)
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Figure 1: This figure (not to scale) describes the two extreme cases of concavity. Observe that as
σb → 1, the benefit function is nearly linear in the interval [e∗, ne∗] and having slope b′(e∗), whereas as
σb → 0, the benefit function plateaus. Note however that as σb is varied, b(e∗) and b′(e∗) remains fixed
whereby there is no scaling and hence equilibria remain unchanged.
The set of Nash equilibria which yield the maximum equilibrium welfare W∗U are called the welfare
maximizing equilibria, equilibria maximizing the w-weighted effort are called effort maximizing equilibria
and equilibria minimizing the cost are called cost minimizing equilibria.
Clearly, from equations (4 - 6), we have that,
W∗U ≥WS∗U , E∗w ≥ ES∗w and C∗ ≤ CS∗. (7)
The problem of showing that specialized equilibria are a refinement insofar as maximum welfare is
concerned amounts to showing the equality W∗U = W
S∗
U . Similarly, to show that specialized equilibria are
a refinement with respect to maximum total weighted effort and minimum total cost we need to show
that E∗w = ES∗w and C∗ = CS∗, respectively.
Notice that Ei(·) is a linear function of x and hence b(Ei(·)) is a concave function, whereby the
objective functions in (4 - 6) are either concave or linear. However the feasible region NE(G) is non-
convex and non-polyhedral and SNE(G) is an integer lattice (this follows from Theorem 7 later). Hence,
showing that specialized equilibria are a refinement under any of the criteria above is a hard problem.
Importantly, the non-polyhedrality of NE(G) implies that these claims cannot be arrived at using an
argument based on extreme points or linear programming.
Let
σb :=
b(ne∗)− b(e∗)
ce∗(n− 1) ,
denote the concavity of the benefit function b as defined by [2]. It is the normalized slope of the
“secant” between e∗ and ne∗ for the function b. Since b is a strictly increasing function, σb > 0, whereas
since b is strictly concave, the slope of the secant is less than the slope of the tangent at e∗, whereby
cσb < b
′(e∗) = c, i.e., σb < 1.
In our analysis we consider two extreme cases, namely, as σb approaches unity and as σb approaches
zero. While we vary σb, we assume that b′(e∗) = c continues to hold and b(e∗) remains unchanged with
σb. The two cases are depicted in Figure 1. As σb → 1, the slope of the secant tends to the slope of b
at e∗. Since the function lies between the tangent and the secant, the function is near-linear between e∗
and ne∗ as σb → 1. On the other hand, as σb → 0, the benefit function plateaus beyond e∗.
An important consequence of holding b(e∗) and b′(e∗) fixed is that it ensures that as σb changes,
the Nash equilibria of the game do not change (see Lemma 7). This allows one to study the welfare of
particular equilibria in comparison with W∗U with varying σb. Bramoulle and Kranton showed that as
σb → 1 the welfare function approaches the total d-weighted effort (plus a constant), where d is a vector
of degrees2 of agents. We show that as σb → 0 the welfare function equals the negative of the total cost
(plus a constant). As a consequence, when σb → 1, the problem of equilibrium welfare maximization
resembles the maximization of the total d-weighted equilibrium effort while as σb → 0, it resembles the
total equilibrium cost minimization.
Our first main result in this paper concerns these extreme regimes of σb.
Theorem 1 (Welfare of specialized equilibria)
For a public goods game over a network without isolated agents,
2The degree of a vertex in a graph is the number of neighbours of the vertex.
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(a) Let d = (d1, . . . , dn)> be the vector of degrees of agents, i.e., di = |Ni| for all i ∈ V. Let S∗ be a
maximum d-weighted independent set in the network and let x∗ be the specialized equilibrium with
agents in S∗ as specialists and the rest as free riders. Then, as σb → 1, the welfare of x∗ approaches
the maximum equilibrium welfare, i.e.,
lim
σb→1
W∗U = lim
σb→1
WU(x
∗) = n
(
b(e∗)− ce∗)+ ce∗αd(G).
Consequently, limσb→1W∗U = limσb→1W
S∗
U .
(b) Suppose the network is a forest. Let S′ be the smallest maximal independent set in the network
and let x′ be the specialized equilibrium with agents in S′ as specialists and the rest as free riders.
Then as σb → 0, the welfare of x′ approaches the maximum equilibrium welfare, i.e.,
lim
σb→0
W∗U = lim
σb→0
WU(x
′) = nb(e∗)− ce∗β(G),
where β(G) is the size of S′. Hence, for forests, limσb→0W∗U = limσb→0W
S∗
U .
(c) The welfare of any distributed equilibrium (if it exists) is independent of σb. Moreover,
WD∗U ≥ lim
σb→0
WS∗U ,
where,
WD∗U = inf{WU(x) | x ∈ DNE(G)},
is the least welfare attained by a distributed equilibrium.
The assumption regarding the absence of isolated agents does not cause loss of generality, and has
been made here for the sake of simplicity. Isolated agents i derive benefits from their own efforts only
and hence exert the same effort e∗ in any equilibrium. Hence their utility at an equilibrium x is always
U soloi (x) = b(e
∗)− ce∗ which is independent of σb (since b(e∗) and b′(e∗) are fixed).
Notice that Theorem 1(a) is a general result pertaining to any network. Equivalently, it says that for
any network G and  > 0, there exists a threshold σH such that for all benefit functions with fixed b(e∗)
and b′(e∗) = c and σb ≥ σH ,
0 ≤W∗U −WU(x∗) ≤ .
Theorem 1(b) pertains specifically to forests (Theorem 1(a) applies to forests too). Here we have that
for any forest G and  > 0, there exists a threshold σL such that for all benefit functions with fixed b(e∗)
and b′(e∗) = c and σb ≤ σL,
0 ≤W∗U −WU(x′) ≤ .
In Theorem 1(c), notice that WD∗U is the least welfare over distributed equilibria. The above theorem is a
consequence of a more general result regarding the ranking of equilibria when they are compared based
on their total weighted effort and total cost which are given by Theorem 2 below.
It is worth noting that in both Theorems 1 and 2, we not only show that there exists a specialized
equilibrium, but also point to a particular equilibrium which approaches the maximum welfare amongst
all equilibria, under the given conditions on the concavity or the structure of the network.
Theorem 2 (Total effort and cost of specialized equilibria)
For a public goods game over a network,
(a) Let w = (w1, . . . , wn)>, wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V , be a set of weights and S∗ be a maximum w-weighted
independent set. Then the specialized equilibrium in which agents in S∗ exert effort e∗ and the rest
are free riders is an effort maximizing equilibrium. Consequently, E∗w = ES∗w .
(b) Suppose the network is a forest, and let S′ be the smallest maximal independent set in the network.
Then the specialized equilibrium in which agents in S′ exert effort e∗ and the rest are free riders is
a cost minimizing equilibrium. Consequently, for forest networks, C∗ = CS∗.
(c) If there exists a distributed equilibrium x = (x1, . . . , xn)>, the cost incurred in it,
∑
i cxi, is at most
as much as that of any specialized equilibrium, whereby C∗ ≤ CD∗ ≤ CS∗, where CD∗ the minimum
cost attained by a distributed equilibrium.
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If network is . . .
Then . . . Any network Forest Well-covered forest
Set of welfare maxi-
mizing equilibria
contains a specialized
equilibrium as σb → 1
contains a specialized
equilibrium as σb → 1
and as σb → 0
contains only special-
ized equilibria
Set of effort maximiz-
ing equilibria
contains a specialized
equilibrium
contains a specialized
equilibrium
contains a specialized
equilibrium
Set of cost minimizing
equilibria
can’t say∗ contains a specialized
equilibrium
any equilibrium incurs
the same cost
Table 1: Summary of the main results in this paper – Theorems 1, 2 and 3.
∗ If the network is regular then there always exists a distributed equilibrium where all agents exert equal
effort. This equilibrium minimizes the total cost.
(d) If the network is regular3, a distributed equilibrium in which all agents exert equal effort minimizes
the equilibrium cost, i.e., C∗ = CD∗.
Notice that the above theorem does not require any assumptions about the benefit function.
We show that a particular class of networks called well-covered forests happen to have even stronger
and more interesting properties. A network G is said to be well-covered if all maximal independent sets
of G have the same size. For a network, if an agent i is adjacent to exactly one other agent j, we say
that i is a dependant of j, and j is the guardian of i. It was shown by Plummer [8] that a forest network
(without isolated agents) is well-covered if and only if all agents are either dependants or guardians, and
every guardian agent has exactly one dependant. Our last main result is the following theorem regarding
welfare maximizing equilibria in well-covered forest networks. Notice that this result holds without any
assumptions on the benefit function or σb.
Theorem 3 (Efficient specialized equilibria in well-covered networks)
For a public goods game over a well-covered forest network,
(a) An equilibrium yields the maximum equilibrium welfare only if it is a specialized equilibrium.
(b) If the network does not have isolated agents, the cost incurred by any equilibrium profile of efforts
is 12ce
∗n.
All our results are comprehensively summarized in Table 1.
Additionally, we obtain results that clarify the structure of equilibrium profiles in such games. In an
equilibrium, if two neighbouring agents i and j exert positive efforts xi and xj such that xi + xj = e∗,
then we call such agents co-specialists, and the link (i, j) joining them is called a co-specialist link. We
show in Section 3 that, in any network at equilibrium, dependants are either specialists, or free riders,
or that they form a co-specialist pair with their guardian. Interestingly, for networks with at least one
dependant, we find that any Nash equilibrium has at least one free rider, i.e., there exists no distributed
equilibrium. We further show that if the network is a forest, then at equilibrium, agents are either
specialists, co-specialists or free riders only.
1.2 Organization of the paper
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides some background on graphs and main
results from our previous work in graph theory. In Section 3, we characterize the Nash equilibria in a
public goods game over a network and discuss the effect of the network on the structure of the equilibrium.
In particular, we discuss results about networks which have dependant and guardian agents. The proof
of Theorem 2 is given in Section 4 which shows that specialized equilibria are a refinement under the
criterion of maximum weighted equilibrium effort for all networks, while they are a refinement under
the criterion of minimum equilibrium cost if the network is a forest. Section 5 proves Theorem 1 and
shows that the specialized equilibrium is a refinement with respect to maximum equilibrium welfare
under conditions on the concavity of the benefit function. In section 6, the result in Theorem 3 is proved
3A network is said to be regular if all agents have the same number of neighbours.
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which gives conditions on equilibria in a well-covered forest network for any benefit function. Finally,
section 7 concludes the paper. In every case where the specialized equilibria form a refinement of the
Nash equilibrium, we give the specialized equilibrium which is optimal.
2 Background
2.1 Independent and dominating sets
The adjacency matrix A = [aij ] of a graphG is a n×n 0-1 matrix such that aij = 1 if and only if (i, j) ∈ E.
The characteristic vector of a set S ⊆ V is a vector 1S with |V | components such that (1S)i = 1 if i ∈ S
and 0 otherwise. S is an independent set of G if and only if 1>SA1S = 0. A maximal independent set is
always a dominating set, i.e., a set such that any vertex not in the set has at least one neighbour in the
set. The minimum cardinality among maximal independent sets is called the independent domination
number and is denoted by β(G). A graph G is said to be well-covered if all maximal independent sets
are of the same size, i.e., α(G) = β(G).
Closely related to independent sets is the concept of matchings. A matching is a set of links such
that no two links have a vertex in common. If every vertex has an link incident on it from a matching
then the matching is called a perfect matching.
Given a set S ⊆ V , the subgraph of G induced by S is the graph GS = (S,ES), where ES = {(i, j) |
i, j ∈ S and (i, j) ∈ E}. Clearly GV = G. Degree of a vertex, defined di := |Ni|, is the number of
neighbours of vertex i. For a vector x ∈ R|V |, we define the support of x as
supp(x) := {i ∈ V | xi 6= 0}.
In the context of public goods provision over a network, for a profile of efforts x in a network G, the
set of agents supp(x) are called the supporting agents, i.e., agents who are not free riders. The graph
induced by them, i.e., Gsupp(x) is called the network of supporting agents.
2.2 The linear complementarity problem and maximal independent sets
In this section we recall our results from [7]. For this purpose we first recall some concepts pertaining to
linear complementarity problems; a definitive resource for this is [3]. Given a matrix M ∈ Rn×n and a
vector q ∈ Rn, the linear complementarity problem LCP(M, q) is the following problem,
Find x = (x1, x2 · · ·xn) ∈ Rn such that (1) x ≥ 0,
(2) y := Mx+ q ≥ 0, LCP(M, q)
(3) y>x = 0.
LCPs generalize Nash Equilibria in bimatrix games, quadratic programs and several other problems.
Consider a simultaneous move game with two players having loss matrices A,B ∈ Rm×n. A mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium [6] is a pair of vectors (x∗, y∗) ∈ ∆n ×∆m such that,
(x∗)>Ay∗ ≤ x>Ay∗, ∀ x ∈ ∆n, (x∗)>By∗ ≤ (x∗)>By, ∀ y ∈ ∆m,
where ∆k := {x ∈ Rk |
∑
i xi = 1, x ≥ 0}. Under certain technical assumptions (see, e.g., [3, p. 6]), it
can be shown that if (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium, then the concatenated vector
[
x′>, y′>
]> solves
LCP(M, q), where,
x′ = x∗/(x∗)>By∗ y′ = y∗/(x∗)>Ay∗,
and,
M =
(
0 A
B> 0
)
, q = −e,
where e denotes a vector of ones in Rm+n. Conversely, if
[
x′> y′>
]> solves LCP(M, q) then x∗ =
x′/(
∑
i x
′
i) and y∗ = y′/
∑
j y
′
j is a Nash equilibrium. In general, equilibria of certain games involving
coupled constraints [5] also reduce to LCPs. For more applications, we refer the reader to [3].
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In our previous work [7], an LCP based continuous optimization formulation was provided for finding
the independence number and independent domination number of a graph. Given a graph G = (V,E)
with adjacency matrix A, consider the problem LCP(G),
LCP(G) Find x ∈ Rn such that x ≥ 0, (A+ I)x ≥ e, x>((A+ I)x− e) = 0,
where I is the |V | × |V | identity matrix, and e is the vector in R|V | with all 1’s. The results from our
previous work [7] that are relevant here are summarized as the following theorem.
Theorem 4 (LCP characterization for maximal independent sets) Consider a graph G = (V,E)
(a) [7, Lemma 4] A binary vector is a solution to LCP(G) if and only if it is the characteristic vector
of a maximal independent set.
(b) [7, Theorem 1] For a non-negative vector w ∈ Rn,
max{w>x | x solves LCP(G)} = αw(G),
and the characteristic vector of the w-weighted maximum independent set is a maximizer.
(c) [7, Example 1] For a graph G,
min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} ≤ β(G),
and the inequality is in general strict.
(d) [7, Theorem 2] If the graph G is a forest,
min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} = β(G),
and the characteristic vector of the smallest maximal independent set is a minimizer.
Theorem 4(a) shows a relation between maximal independent sets of a graph and the solutions of the
LCP(G). The only integral solutions of LCP(G) are characteristic vectors of maximal independent sets
of G. Since the w-weighted maximum independent set is also maximal, it is a feasible solution to the
maximization problem in Theorem 4(b). However Theorem 4(b) states that it is in fact a maximizer of
this problem.
One might expect that analogous to the result in Theorem 4(b), the characteristic vector of the
smallest maximal independent set is a minimizer of e>x among all solutions to LCP(G). However this is
not true in general as given by Theorem 4(c). The gap is shown to be strict even if the graph is bipartite
and regular (see [7, Example 1]).
The equality in Theorem 4(c) is always attained if the graph G is a forest, as indicated by Theorem
4(d). This is attributed to the peculiar structure of the solution set of LCP(G) when G is a forest.
Other than the above results, we also state here a few lemmas from our previous work that we use in
the present paper. We refer the reader to [7] for detailed proofs to these claims.
Lemma 5 For a graph G,
(a) [7, Lemma 8] If G has n vertices and is regular with degree d, then
min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} = n
d+ 1
, (8)
and the vector ed+1 is a minimizer.
(b) [7, Lemma 9] If G is a forest, and x is a solution to LCP(G), then there exists a maximal inde-
pendent set S ⊆ supp(x).
We now apply the results in Theorem 4 and Lemma 5 to give conditions under which specialized
equilibria are a refinement of the Nash equilibrium of the public goods games over networks. We do
this by establishing a relation between NE(G) and the solution set of LCP(G) and thereby obtaining a
handle on the structure of equilibria in these games.
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3 Structure of equilibria
3.1 Characterization of equilibria in a public goods game over a network
In this section, we show a relation between LCPs and equilibria of the public goods game and establish a
few properties regarding the equilibria. We first recall the conditions given by Bramoulle and Kranton,
on the effort levels of the agents at a Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 6 (Section 3.1 [2]) Conditions on efforts at equilibrium
A profile of efforts x∗ ≥ 0 is an equilibrium of a public goods game in a network G if and only if exactly
one of the following is true,
(a)
∑
j∈Ni x
∗
j > e
∗, and x∗i = 0,
(b)
∑
j∈Ni x
∗
j ≤ e∗, and x∗i = e∗ −
∑
j∈Ni xj.
The above lemma is argued as follows, an agent i has incentive to exert positive effort only if the total
effort from which it benefits,
∑
j∈Ni x
∗
j , is at most as much as the effort level for which marginal benefit
equals the marginal cost. If however the total effort of the neighbours of i is lesser than this effort level,
then i has incentive to exert effort equal to this deficit, but no more.
As a consequence of Lemma 6, if x is an equilibrium profile then,
0 ≤ xi ≤ e∗, (9)
for all i ∈ V , indicating that presence of a network leads to lower effort by agents, as one might expect.
We refer to 1e∗x as the normalized profile of efforts.
We observe that the conditions given in Lemma 6 resemble the either-or nature given by the equations
in (LCP(M, q)). We show in the following theorem that the equilibria of a public goods game over a
network G are exactly characterized by LCP(G).
Theorem 7 (Normalized equilibrium efforts are solutions to LCP(G))
A profile of efforts x is a Nash equilibrium of the public goods game over the network G if and only if
1
e∗
x solves LCP(G).
Proof : A vector x ∈ Rn solves LCP(G) means,
x ≥ 0, ⇔ xi ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ V, (10)
(AG + I)x ≥ e, ⇔ Ei(x) ≥ 1, ∀ i ∈ V, (11)
y>
(
(A+ I)x− e) = 0. ⇔ xi(Ei(x)− 1) = 0, ∀ i ∈ V. (12)
Recall that the conditions given in Lemma 6 are both necessary and sufficient for a profile of efforts x∗
to be a Nash equilibrium of a public goods game over a network G. Writing these conditions differently
we get that, x∗ is a Nash equilibrium if and only if exactly one of the following is true.
(a) x∗i = 0 and Ei(x∗) > e∗
(b) Ei(x∗) = e∗ and x∗i ≥ 0
Since Ei(·) is a linear function Ei( 1e∗x∗) = 1e∗ Ei(x∗). Hence the above conditions are equivalent to saying
that if x∗ is an equilibrium, then for each i, 1e∗x
∗
i ≥ 0 and Ei( 1e∗x∗) ≥ 1, and at least one of these
inequality is tight, i.e., 1e∗x
∗(Ei( 1e∗x∗)− 1) = 0. This proves the theorem.
Thus at equilibrium, the effort of every agent i obeys the conditions given by (EE(G)),
Equilibrium Effort xi ≥ 0, Ei(x) ≥ e∗ and xi = 0 or Ei(x) = e∗. (EE(G))
We now apply our results regarding LCP(G) to Theorem 7 to establish our first result regarding the
general structure of equilibria of a public goods game over a network. Recall that if two neighbouring
agents i and j exert efforts xi > 0 and xj > 0 such that xi + xj = e∗, then such agents are referred to
as co-specialists, and the link (i, j) joining them is called a co-specialist link.
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If the equilibrium is . . .
Then . . . 1. Any equilibrium 2. Stable 3. Unstable
1. an agent which is the single
dependant of its guardian is
either a specialist, free
rider or co-specialist
a specialist either a specialist, free
rider or co-specialist
2. agents that are not single de-
pendants of their guardian are
all specialists or all free
riders
all specialists all specialists or all free
riders
Table 2: This table describes efforts of dependant agents based on whether an equilibrium is stable or
not.
Lemma 8 In a public goods game over a network G,
(a) The supporting agents in any equilibrium effort profile form a dominating set of the network.
(b) If a free rider leaves the network at equilibrium, then the equilibrium remains undisturbed.
(c) In any equilibrium, neighbours of a specialist free ride, whereby the specialists form an independent
set of the network.
(d) In any equilibrium, neighbours of both co-specialists free ride, whereby co-specialist links form a
matching of the network.
(e) If x is an equilibrium profile of efforts and di = |Ni| is the degree of the agent i such that di > 0,
then
xi ≤ e∗ ≤ Ei(x) ≤ die∗. (13)
Equality holds in the second inequality if agent i is not a free rider; further, equality holds in both
the first and second inequality only if i is a specialist. The third inequality holds with equality if
and only if i is a free rider such that all its neighbours are specialists. If di = 0, xi = Ei(x) = e∗.
Proof of Lemma 8: See Appendix
3.2 Networks with dependants
We now show a few results about the structure of the equilibria of public goods provision over a network
containing at least one dependant-guardian pair. Recall that, in a network, if an agent i is adjacent
to only one other agent j, then we call i a dependant of j (j is called the guardian of i). The link
(i, j) linking a dependant to its guardian is called a pendant line (a term borrowed from graph theory).
If j and i are dependants of each other, we call them co-dependants. Table 2 the summarizes results
regarding equilibria in networks which have at least one dependant-guardian pair. In Table 2, by stable
equilibrium we mean stability under best-response dynamics (as defined and considered by [2]).
Proof of Table 2: Consider a game on a network having a guardian i with a dependant j. First
consider an arbitrary equilibrium x of this game. Clearly, we have three possibilities: xj = 0 (j is a free
rider), xj = e∗ (j is a specialist) or 0 < xj < e∗. Suppose j is neither a specialist nor a free rider. By
(EE(G)), Ej(x) = xj + xi = e∗, i.e., i and j are co-specialists. Hence a dependant is either a specialist,
free rider or co-specialist. We now show that if i has in addition to j, another dependant, say k, then
j cannot be a co-specialist. Observe that k being a neighbour of co-specialist agent i is a free rider by
Lemma 8(d). Hence Ek(x) = xi < e∗, which contradicts (EE(G)). Hence j can be either a specialist
or a free rider but not a co-specialist. Since dj = 1, from (13), Ej(x) = e∗. If j is a free rider, then
Ej(x) = xi = e∗, i.e., i is specialist, whereby all dependants of i are free riders, by Lemma 8(c). And if
j is a specialist, i is a free rider (again by Lemma 8(c)), whereby from (EE(G)) every dependant k of i
must exert effort e∗. Hence, dependants of i are either all specialists (in which case i is a free rider) or
they are all free riders (in which case i is a specialist).
Now consider a stable equilibrium. Bramoulle and Kranton showed that an equilibrium is stable only
if it is specialized and all its free riders have at least two specialist neighbours (See [2, Thm. 2]). Since
the equilibrium is stable, it is necessarily specialized whereby the dependant j is either a specialist or
a free rider. But if j is a free rider, it has only one specialist neighbour i whereby the equilibrium is
unstable. Hence every dependant of the network is necessarily a specialist for an equilibrium to be stable
under best response dynamics.
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If a dependant is a . . . and if it is . . .
1. Specialist 2. Free rider 3. Co-specialist
Then the
equilibrium
. . .
may be stable is unstable is unstable with sub-
optimal welfare #
1. the only dependant of its
guardian
may be stable is unstable is not possible 2. not the only dependant
of it guardian
Table 3: This table describes the effect of the efforts of dependant agents on the stability of the
equilibrium.
# A dependant can exist as a co-specialist in equilibrium only if it is the sole dependant of its guardian.
However this is not only an unstable equilibrium, but also yields suboptimal welfare. We show this in
Theorem 13 later.
For unstable equilibria, the results follow from the discussion of arbitrary equilibria.
Observe that if a co-dependant pair exists, then only one of the two agents (who are both dependants)
can be specialists whereby the equilibrium is always unstable. For better clarity, the results in Table 2
are reorganized in Table 3 putting in perspective the effect of the effort of a dependant at equilibrium on
the stability of the equilibrium. Using the results in Tables 2 and 3, we have the result below regarding
the non-existence of distributed equilibria in a network with at least one dependant.
Theorem 9 (Free riders in networks with dependants)
In a network with at least one dependant who is not a co-dependant, every Nash equilibrium always has
a free-riding agent.
Proof : Suppose a guardian agent i has multiple dependants. Then by Table 2 (Row 2), either all the
dependants of i are free riders or they are all specialists; in the latter case i itself is a free rider. Hence
there exists at least one free rider.
Now suppose the guardian i has only one dependant j such that i and j are not co-dependants, i.e.,
i has another neighbour k. In this case, by Table 2 (Row 1), either (i) the j is a free rider (and i is a
specialist) or (ii) j is a specialist (and i is a free rider), or (iii) i and j form a co-specialist pair. In the
latter case, k is a free rider according to Lemma 8(d). Thus in every case, there always exists at least
one free riding agent.
3.3 Forest networks
We now consider the structure of equilibria on forests. A network of agents is called a forest if there
is no cycle between them. We refer the reader to [1] for a general introduction to forests and their
properties. Here we recall that an induced subgraph of a forest is a forest and that a forest network can
be represented as a disjoint union of trees (thus, for any two distinct trees in this union, there is no link
in the forest having one vertex in each tree).
A vertex in a graph is isolated if it has degree zero (i.e., no neighbours). A link is said to be isolated
if both vertices in the link have degree unity. Note also that a tree which is not an isolated vertex has
at least two dependants [1]. The following lemma is the interpretation of our previous graph theoretic
results Lemma 6(c) and Lemma 9 from [7], in that order, in the context of public goods provision over
networks.
Lemma 10 (Structure of equilibria in forest networks)
For a public goods game over a forest network G,
(a) If the game admits a distributed equilibrium, then the network is a disjoint union of isolated links
and isolated agents.
(b) The supporting agents in any equilibrium are either specialists or co-specialists.
(c) If an equilibrium profile x is not specialized, there exists another specialized equilibrium y such that
supp(y) ⊂ supp(x). This specialized equilibrium incurs the same cost as the original equilibrium,
i.e., ce>y = ce>x.
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Figure 2: This figure shows six different equilibria of a public goods game over a tree network of 10
agents. A dotted line between agents indicates adjacency. Agents denoted by large black circles are
specialists, whereas those denoted by small black circles are free riders. A solid line between adjacent
agents indicates a co-specialist link, with black semicircles denoting the co-specialist agents. (B), (C)
and (E) are specialized equilibria, whereas (A), (D) and (F ) are hybrid equilibria. For an agent i of the
network, the number denotes the normalized effort 1e∗xi exerted by it at equilibrium while the normalized
effort of the closed neighbourhood Ei( 1e∗x) is mentioned for equilibria (A) and (B) are mentioned in
parenthesis. Observe that 1e∗xi ≥ 0, Ei( 1e∗x) ≥ 1 and at least one of the two inequalities is tight, as
indicated by (EE(G)).
∗∗∗ In equilibrium (D), x+ y ≥ 1 and w + z ≥ 1 are necessary for it to be an equilibrium.
(d) The cost of the equilibrium effort profile is
ce∗
(
#(specialists) + 12#(co− specialists)
)
,
where #(·) is stands for “number of”.
Proof :
(a) Consider a forest network G which is a disjoint union of m trees T1, . . . , Tm, such that G ad-
mits a distributed equilibrium x. Then, since the trees T1, . . . , Tm are disjoint, the subvector xTk
corresponding to efforts of agents in Tk is a distributed equilibrium over Tk for all k.
For some k, let agent j be a dependant in Tk and let i be the guardian of j. If Tk has more
than two agents, we must have di > 1 (since Tk is a connected graph), whereby i and j are not
co-dependants. Hence Tk satisfies the condition in Lemma 9. This contradicts the possibility of
a distributed equilibrium xTk . Hence for any k, Tk must consist of at most two agents. Hence G
consists of isolated links and isolated agents.
(b) Let x ∈ NE(G). The network of supporting agents Gsupp(x) is also a forest since it is an induced
subgraph of the forest G. Let xsupp(x) denote the efforts exerted by the supporting agents. Observe
that from Lemma 8(b), it follows that xsupp(x) is an equilibrium for the public goods game over
the forest Gsupp(x). Moreover, this equilibrium is distributed. Now, from Lemma 10(a), it follows
that Gsupp(x) consists only of isolated links and isolated vertices. The isolated links correspond to
co-specialist links whereas the isolated vertices correspond to specialists. This proves the claim.
(c) By Theorem 7, we know that 1e∗x solves LCP(G). We know from Lemma 5(b) that if the network
is a forest, there always exists a maximal independent set S ⊆ supp( 1e∗x) = supp(x). The agents
in S form a specialized equilibrium given by y := e∗1S , whereby supp(y) = S. This proves the first
part of the lemma. We now show that both equilibria x and y incur the same cost.
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If network is . . .
Then . . . Any network Forest Well-covered forest
Supporting
agents are
not free riders specialists or co-specialists specialists or co-specialists
Total equilib-
rium cost is
c e>x ce∗
(
#(specialists) + 12#(co− specialists)
)
1
2ce
∗n ††
Table 4: Summary of roperties of supporting agents as described in Lemma 10.
†† Follows from Theorem 3(b), proved later in Section 6.
From Lemma 10(b) above, we know that the supporting agents in x are either specialists or
co-specialists. Let agent k be a specialist in the equilibrium x. We first show that k is also
a specialist in y. Observe that if k is not a specialist in y, then k is a free rider. Hence
Ek(y) =
∑
k′∈supp(y) akk′yk′ ≤
∑
k′∈supp(x) akk′yk′ = 0, since by Lemma 8(c), k has no neigh-
bours in supp(x). This means that y does not satisfy (EE(G)); a contradiction to y being an
equilibrium. Every specialist in x is a specialist in y.
Now let i and j be co-specialists in x. We now show that exactly one of i and j specializes in y
whereas the other free rides. By Lemma 8(c), it is clear that both i and j cannot be specialists
in y, since they are adjacent in G. On the other hand, suppose both i and j are free riders in y.
Then, Ei(y) =
∑
k′∈supp(y) aik′yk′ ≤
∑
k′∈supp(x) aik′yk′ = yj +
∑
k′∈supp(x)\{j} aik′yk′ = 0, since by
Lemma 8(d) neighbours of co-specialists free ride, whereby i has no neighbours in supp(x) other
than j.
Thus, out of every pair of co-specialists in x, one agent specializes in the specialized equilibrium y,
while the other free rides. This substitution of effort between co-specialists requires the same total
effort. Hence, the equilibrium cost
ce>x = c
(
#(specialists in x) + 12#(co− specialists in x)
)
= c# (specialists in y) = ce>y, (14)
i.e., the cost incurred by both equilibria is the same.
(d) This was shown in (14) above.
Lemma 10(b) means that in an equilibrium x in a public goods game over a forest, if an agent i is
neither a specialist nor a free rider, i.e., 0 < xi < e∗, then there always exists a neighbour j of i that is
a co-specialist of i in equilibrium x and, in another equilibrium, substitutes the deficit of the effort of i.
In the specialized equilibrium described in part (c), in every co-specialist pair, one agent specializes to
substitutes the effort of its co-specialist, who then free rides. The results in Lemma 10 are summarized
in Table 4.
In Figure 2, various equilibria on a tree network are shown. Notice that (B) and (E) are specialized
equilibria contained in the support of equilibria (A) and (D) respectively.
4 Refinement of the equilibrium based on weighted total effort
and cost
In this section, we prove Theorem 2 and compare equilibria based on their total weighted effort and
the total cost incurred, and study how the structure of the network affects the existence of an optimum
specialized equilibrium. The cost incurred by an equilibrium is ce>x, whereas for a set of weights wi ≥ 0,
the w-weighted effort is w>x. Recall from the discussion in the introduction that although the above
functions for ranking equilibria are linear, finding the optimum equilibrium is a hard problem.
Proof of Theorem 2
(a) Let S∗ be the maximum w-weighted independent set in G. We need to show that e∗1S∗ is a
specialized equilibrium that attains the maximum w-weighted equilibrium effort. Let x be an
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equilibrium profile. By Theorem 7 we know that 1e∗x solves LCP(G), whereby from Theorem 4(b)
we can say that
E∗w = max
{
w>x
∣∣ x ∈ NE(G)} = max{w>e∗y ∣∣ y solves LCP(G)} = e∗αw(G).
Since wi ≥ 0 for all i ∈ V, S∗ is also a maximal independent set. As a consequence e∗1S∗ is a
specialized equilibrium, and its weighted effort is e∗w>1S∗ = e∗αw(G), by definition of the w-
weighted maximum independent set. It follows that e∗1S∗ attains the maximum total weighted
equilibrium effort and hence E∗w = ES∗w .
(b) Observe that the minimum cost in equilibrium is given by,
C∗ = c ·min{e>x ∣∣ x ∈ NE(G)} = c · e∗min{e>x ∣∣ x solves LCP(G)} .
By Theorem 4(d) we can say that if the network G is a forest, the above quantity is ce∗β(G). Let
S′ denote the smallest maximal independent set of G, then e∗1S′ is a specialized equilibrium which
incurs a cost ce∗e>1S = ce∗β(G). Hence if the network is a forest, we have that C∗ = CS∗, and
e∗1S′ incurs the minimum cost.
(c) We first show a more general result: If y is an equilibrium and a subset S ⊆ supp(y) of the
supporting agents of y form a maximal independent set of the network, then the specialized equi-
librium supported on S requires total effort at least as much as that of y, i.e., e∗|S| ≥∑j yj . Let
U := supp(y)\S. Then, from (EE(G)), ∀ i ∈ supp(y),
Ei(y) =
∑
j∈V
aijyj + yi = e
∗.
Summing over i ∈ S gives, ∑
i∈S
∑
j∈V
aijyj + e>y −
∑
j∈U
yj = e
∗|S|.
Thus,
e∗|S| − e>y (a)=
∑
i∈S
∑
j∈U
aijyj −
∑
j∈U
yj =
∑
j∈U
(|NS(j)| − 1)yj
(b)
≥ 0.
The equality in (a) follows from the observation that aij is nonzero for i ∈ S only if j /∈ S due to
S being an independent set. Moreover, in this set V \S, yj is non-zero only for j ∈ U . Now, since
S is a maximal independent set, every vertex not in S has at least one neighbour in S whereby
|NS(j)| ≥ 1 and justifies the inequality (b).
Now, if the network is such that it admits a distributed equilibrium, all the agents in the network are
supporting agents of this equilibrium whereby the support of any specialized equilibrium is clearly
its subset. Following the discussion above, we can say that the cost of a distributed equilibrium is
at most as much as that of any specialized equilibrium, i.e., CD∗ ≤ CS∗.
(d) By Lemma 5(a), we know that if the network is regular, ed+1 is a solution to LCP(G) such that
it minimizes the function e>x amongst all solutions of LCP(G). It follows from Theorem 7 that
e∗ ed+1 is a distributed equilibrium of the public goods game of the regular network with minimum
cost, whereby C∗ = CD∗. This proves the Theorem 2(d).
5 Refinement of the equilibrium based on welfare
In this section we prove Theorem 1 by studying the welfare of specialized equilibria. We establish
conditions on the concavity of the benefit function and on the structure of the underlying network for
which there exists a specialized equilibrium which yields maximum equilibrium welfare. Moreover, we
also give the specialized equilibrium which yields optimal welfare, under these conditions.
We show that under certain conditions on the concavity of the benefit function, a limiting result is
possible for all networks. However if the class of networks is narrowed to forests, then the result holds
for a larger class of benefit functions b. Hence specialized equilibria may be considered a refinement of
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the Nash equilibrium of the public goods game over a network, when searching for welfare maximizing
equilibria.
While proving Theorem 1 we first show bounds on the welfare of equilibrium profiles thereby estab-
lishing a range for the maximum equilibrium welfare. We then show the convergence of these bounding
functions to identify the behaviour of the welfare function and the maximum equilibrium welfare as the
concavity of the benefit function varies. While varying the concavity of the benefit function, we keep
b(e∗) and b′(e∗) fixed whereby the equilibra remain unchanged.
To this end, for µ ∈ Rn, define,
θµ := max{µ>x | x ∈ NE(G)} and θSµ := max{µ>x | x ∈ SNE(G)}.
Lemma 11 For µ ∈ Rn, θµ and θSµ are continuous functions of µ.
Proof : Observe that θµ and θSµ are both value functions of the optimization of a continuous function
µ>x over sets NE(G) and SNE(G) that are compact as well as independent of µ. If follows from stability
results in optimization theory, such as [4, Thm. 7], that both θµ and θSµ are continuous.
For the rest of the section, we assume that the network does not have any isolated agents, i.e., di ≥ 1
for all i as assumed in the statement of the theorem. Define
σj :=

b(dje
∗)−b(e∗)
ce∗(dj−1) if dj > 1,
σb if dj = 1.
and σ′j :=
 1c b′(dje∗) if dj > 1,
σb if dj = 1.
If dj > 1, observe that σj denotes the normalized4 slope of the secant between (e∗, b(e∗)) and (dje∗, b(dje∗)),
while σ′j denotes the normalized slope of the tangent to the benefit function b at the point dje∗. These
have been depicted in Figure 3 for clarity. Let lj = (σj +
∑
i aijσi − 1) and uj = (σ′j +
∑
i aijσ
′
i − 1).
Denote by σ, σ′, l and u the corresponding vectors with n components.
In establishing Theorem 1, we need to be able to formally relate W∗U to changes in σb. We also note
that while the limiting behaviour of WU as σb → 1 is known from [2, Prop 1], it does not automatically
yield a proof of Theorem 1. The following theorem provides linear upper and lower bounds on the welfare
of equilibrium effort profiles and the maximum equilibrium welfare. These bounds are essential in the
proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 12 For a public goods game over a network without isolated agents, if x is an equilibrium
effort profile,
(a) The welfare function is bounded as follows,
cl>x ≤WU(x)− nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ c u>x+ ce∗d>
(
σ − σ′), (15)
whereby,
cθl ≤W∗U − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ cθu + ce∗d>
(
σ − σ′), (16)
and similarly ,
ce∗θSl ≤WS∗U − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ ce∗θSu + ce∗d>
(
σ − σ′). (17)
(b) Keeping b′(e∗) and b(e∗) fixed and varying σb, we have that,
lim
σb→1
lj = lim
σb→1
uj = dj , for all j, (18)
lim
σb→0
lj = lim
σb→0
uj = −1, for all j, (19)
lim
σb→0
σj − σ′j = lim
σb→1
σj − σ′j = 0, for all j. (20)
(c) Keeping b′(e∗) and b(e∗) fixed and varying σb, we have that,
lim
σb→1
WU(x) = n
(
b(e∗)− ce∗)+ cd>x,
lim
σb→0
WU(x) = nb(e
∗)− ce>x.
4Normalization refers to division by c.
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Proof :
(a) From Lemma from 8(e), we know that for an equilibrium profile of efforts x, e∗ ≤ Ei(x) ≤ dje∗ for
agents j with dj > 1. Due to the concavity of the benefit function, the tangent at dje∗ always lies
above the function whereas the secant between (e∗, b(e∗)) and (dje∗, b(dje∗)) always lies below the
function for the interval [e∗, dje∗] (see Figure 3). Hence we have,
b(e∗) + cσj(Ej(x)− e∗) ≤ b(Ej(x)) ≤ b(dje∗)− cσ′j(dje∗ − Ej(x)), (21)
⇐⇒ cσjEj(x) ≤ b(Ej(x))− b(e∗) + cσje∗ ≤ cσ′jEj(x) + ce∗dj(σj − σ′j), (22)
where the equivalence follows from the equation b(dje∗) = b(e∗) + cσje∗(dj − 1) and subtracting
b(e∗) − cσje∗ from all sides. For the case where dj = 1, it can be seen from Lemma 8(e), that
Ej(x) = e∗ whereby b(Ej(x)) = b(e∗), i.e., (21) holds for agents who are dependants. Now since
WU(x) =
∑
j∈V
(
b(Ej(x))− cxj
)
, the sum of the inequalities in (22) for all agents j, gives
c
∑
j
(σjEj(x)− xj) ≤WU(x)− nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ c
∑
j
(σ′jEj(x)− xj) + ce∗dj(σj − σ′j).
Observe that,∑
j
(
σjEj(x)− xj
)
:=
∑
j
(
σj(xj +
∑
i
aijxi)− xj
)
=
∑
j
(σj − 1)xj +
∑
j
σj
∑
i
aijxi
(c)
=
∑
j
(σj − 1)xj +
∑
i
xi
∑
j
aijσj
(d)
=
∑
j
(
σj − 1 +
∑
i
aijσi
)
xj = l
>x,
where the equality in (c) is due to interchanging the order of summation and the equality in (d) holds
by exchange of summation indices i and j. Following a similar argument,we get
∑
j σ
′
jEj(x)−xj =
u>x. The bounds on WU(x) − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ follow directly. Moreover, the bounds on the
maximum equilibrium welfare W∗U in (16) and the maximum specialized equilibrium welfare W
S∗
U
in (17) follow after maximizing all quantities in (15) over NE(G) and SNE(G) , respectively.
(b) We first show the intermediate limits,
lim
σb→1
σj = lim
σb→1
σ′j = 1, and lim
σb→0
σj = lim
σb→0
σ′j = 0, for all j.
Since lj , uj and σj − σ′j are linear functions of σ and σ′, by the sum law of limits, showing the
above limits is sufficient to prove the limits in the statement of the theorem.
Case I: (dj = 1) Clearly, by definition σj = σ′j = σb, whereby the limits hold trivially for both
σb → 0 and σb → 1.
Case II: (dj > 1) First consider the case σb → 1. To show the limit of σj , observe that σj ≥ σb
since b is increasing and concave. Moreover, by the concavity of b, the tangent at e∗ lies above the
function, i.e.,
b′(e∗)(dj − 1)e∗ + b(e∗) ≥ b(dje∗). (23)
Since b′(e∗) = c, rearranging, we have σj ≤ 1. Now since σj ≥ σb, we get limσb→1 σj = 1.
For computing limσb→1 σ′j , let σ∗ denote the normalized slope of the secant between (e∗, b(e∗)) and(
(n−1)e∗, b((n−1)e∗)). Observe that since b is increasing and concave, we again have 1 ≥ σ∗ ≥ σb,
whereby we have limσb→1 σ∗ = 1.
Since 1 ≤ dj ≤ n− 1 for any j, by the concavity of b, we have,
b′(e∗) ≥ b′(dje∗) ≥ b′
(
(n− 1)e∗). (24)
Moreover, an inequality similar to (23) with the tangent to b at (n− 1)e∗ gives,
b′((n− 1)e∗) ≥ 1
e∗
(b(ne∗)− b((n− 1)e∗)) = 1
e∗
(b(e∗) + e∗c(n− 1)σb − (b(e∗) + e∗c(n− 2)σ∗)),
whereby σ′j ≤ 1. Hence combining with (24) gives, limσb→1 b′(dje∗) ≥ c limσb→1
(
(n− 1)σb − (n−
2)σ∗)
)
= c, whereby, limσb→1 σ′j ≥ 1. Since σ′j ≤ 1, limσb→1 σ′j = 1.
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Figure 3: Bounds on b(Ei(x)) for j such that dj > 1 as given by the inequality in (21). The tangent
and secant have slopes cσ′j and cσj respectively. Due to concavity of the function b, the tangent always
lies above the function and the secant always lies below the function for the interval [e∗, dje∗]. Hence
b(e∗) + cσj
(Ej(x)− e∗) and b(dje∗)− cσ′j(dje∗ − Ej(x)) are the bounds. In the case where dj = 1, both
quantities become b(e∗)
To show the limits of σj and σ′j as σb → 0, for dj > 1, we need the following set of inequalities,
0 ≤ σ′j ≤ σj ≤ σb
(
n− 1
dj − 1
)
. (25)
Observe that the first and second inequality follow from the monotocity and concavity of b. The
third inequality follows from 0 ≤ b(ne∗) − b(dje∗) = b(ne∗) − b(e∗) −
(
b(dje
∗) − b(e∗)) = σb(n −
1)e∗ − σj(dj − 1)e∗. Hence limσb→0 σj = limσb→0 σ′j = 0.
(c) Applying limits to the result in part (a), we have that
lim
σb→1
cl>x ≤ lim
σb→1
WU(x)− nb(e∗) + ce∗ lim
σb→1
∑
j
σj ≤ lim
σb→1
cu>x+ lim
σb→1
ce∗d>(σ − σ′),
and
lim
σb→0
cl>x ≤ lim
σb→0
WU(x)− nb(e∗) + ce∗ lim
σb→0
∑
j
σj ≤ lim
σb→0
cu>x+ lim
σb→0
ce∗d>(σ − σ′).
Applying the limits from part (b) proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 1
(a) Let x∗ be the specialized equilibrium as mentioned in the statement of the theorem, whereby
x∗ = e∗1S , using Theorem 7. The limiting value of the welfare at this equilibrium, using Theorem
12(c) is,
lim
σb→1
WU(x
∗) = n(b(e∗)− ce∗) + ce∗
∑
j∈S
dj = n(b(e
∗)− ce∗) + ce∗αd(G), (26)
since S is a d-weighted maximum independent set in the network. We now calculate the limiting
value of W∗U using (16), i.e.,
lim
σb→1
cθl ≤ lim
σb→1
W∗U − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ lim
σb→1
cθu.
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However, as a consequence of Theorem 12(b), limσb→1 l = limσb→1 u = d, whereby using Lemma
11, limσb→1 θl = limσb→1 θu = θd. Moreover, since d ≥ 0, θd = e∗αd(G) by Theorem 4(b). Hence
lim
σb→1
W∗U = n
(
b(e∗)− ce∗)+ ce∗αd(G). (27)
Hence limσb→1W∗U = limσb→1WU(x
∗). Now, since W∗U ≥WS∗U ≥WU(x∗), taking limits on all three
quantities gives
lim
σb→1
W∗U ≥ lim
σb→1
WS∗U ≥ lim
σb→1
WU(x
∗)
Since the limiting values of W∗U and WU(x
∗) are the same, the above inequality proves the result.
(b) Consider a forest G and let x′ be the specialized equilibrium as mentioned in the statement of
the theorem, whereby x′ = e∗1S′ , using Theorem 7. The limiting value of the welfare at this
equilibrium, using Theorem 12(c) is,
lim
σb→0
WU(x
′) = nb(e∗)− ce∗
∑
j∈S′
1 = nb(e∗)− ce∗β(G), (28)
since S′ is the smallest maximal independent set in the network, i.e., cardinality of S′ is β(G).
Now, to calculate the limiting value of W∗U, applying limits to (16) gives,
lim
σb→0
cθl ≤ lim
σb→0
W∗U − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ lim
σb→0
cθu.
However, from Theorem 12(b) limσb→0 l = limσb→0 u = −e, whereby using Lemma 11, we have
limσb→0 θl = limσb→0 θu = θ−e. Now observe that,
−θ−e = min{e>x | x ∈ NE(G)} = e∗min{e>y | y solves LCP(G)}.
Moreover, since G is a forest, we know from Theorem 4(d), that min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} =
β(G). Hence
lim
σb→0
W∗U = nb(e
∗)− ce∗β(G), (29)
whereby limσb→0W∗U = limσb→0WU(x
′). Since WU ≥ WS∗U ≥ WU(x′), taking limits on all three
quantities and arguing as in part (a) gives the result.
(c) Let the network G admit a distributed equilibrium x∗, i.e., x∗i > 0 for all i. It follows from (EE(G))
that for any x∗, Ei(x) = e∗ for all agents i. Hence WU(x∗) = nb(e∗)− ce>x∗, which is independent
of variation in σb (recall that keeping b(e∗) and b′(e∗) fixed as σb varies ensures that the equilibria
are unaltered).
Let S be a maximal independent set of G, whereby e∗1S is a specialized equilibrium. From Theorem
2(c), the cost ce>x∗ incurred by the distributed equilirium is at most as much as the cost ce∗|S|
incurred by the specialized equilibrium e∗1S , i.e., ce∗|S| ≥ ce>x∗ or equivalently,
WU(x
∗) ≥ nb(e∗)− ce∗|S|.
Observe that this holds true for any x∗ ∈ DNE(G) and any maximal independent set S, i.e., the
variable S in the RHS is independent of the variable x∗ in the LHS. Hence, we may infimize over
x∗ and maximize over S, leading to,
inf{WU(x∗) | x∗ ∈ DNE(G)} ≥ max{nb(e∗)− ce∗|S| | e∗1S ∈ SNE(G)},
WD∗U ≥ nb(e∗)− ce∗min{|S| | S is maximal independent},
= nb(e∗)− ce∗β(G). (30)
The limiting value of WS∗U using (17) is,
lim
σb→0
cθSl ≤ lim
σb→0
WS∗U − nb(e∗) + ce∗e>σ ≤ lim
σb→0
cθSu.
Now, as in part (b), limσb→0 l = limσb→0 u = −e, whereby limσb→0WS∗U = nb(e∗)+cθS−e. Moreover,
again as in part (b),
−θS−e = min{e>x | x ∈ SNE(G)} = e∗min{|S| | S is maximal independent} = e∗β(G),
since β(G) is the cardinality of the smallest maximal independent set of G. Hence,
lim
σb→0
WS∗U = nb(e
∗)− ce∗β(G). (31)
The statement of the theorem follows from (30) and (31).
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Figure 4: Examples of well-covered networks. The vertices marked by larger circles form maximal
independent sets. All maximal independent sets in the well-covered tree network consist of 4 agents
while those in the cycle network consist of 3 agents respectively. Observe that the well-covered tree over
8 agents depicted in the figure has exactly 4 guardian-dependant pairs such that exactly one of the two
is part of any maximal independent set.
6 Welfare and cost in well-covered forest networks
In this section we prove Theorem 3. A network G is said to be well-covered if all its maximal independent
sets have the same cardinality, i.e., α(G) = β(G). Figure 4 shows example networks which are well-
covered.
Before proceeding to the proof, we show a more general result regarding the role of dependants on
the efficiency of the equilibrium. This result is put to use while proving Theorem 3(a).
Theorem 13 (Co-specialist pendant lines are inefficient)
In a public goods game, if a guardian has a single dependant, then in an equilibrium yielding maximum
equilibrium welfare, exactly one of the guardian-dependant pair specializes whereby the other free rides.
Proof : Recall from Table 2 (Row 1, Column 1), that if a guardian has a single dependant, then
either one of the guardian or dependant free rides or they both form a co-specialist pair. Note that an
equilibrium where the guardian-dependant pair form a co-specialist link is not possible if the guardian has
multiple dependants (See Table 3 (Row 2, Column 3)). We have to show that if the guardian-dependant
pair form a co-specialist link, then the equilibrium yields suboptimal welfare. We affirm this by showing
the existence of another equilibrium which yields higher welfare.
Let agent i be the only dependant of agent j such that they are not co-dependants. Let x be an
equilibrium such that i and j form a co-specialist link, i.e., xi+xj = e∗. From Lemma 8(d), we can infer
that all the neighbours of j other than i free ride in the equilibrium x, i.e.,
xk = 0, ∀ k ∈ Nj\{i}. (32)
Now, consider the profile of efforts y, where yj = e∗, yi = 0 and for all other agents k exert the same
effort yk = xk. We first show y ∈ NE(G) and then prove that indeed WU (y) > WU (x).
Observe that for all agents k other than j and its neighbours, the effort of closed neighbourhood
remains unchanged, i.e., yk = xk, and Ek(y) = Ek(x), whereby,
yk ≥ 0, Ek(y) ≥ e∗, yk(Ek(y)− e∗) = 0, ∀ k /∈ {j} ∪Nj , (33)
from (EE(G)) since x is an equilibrium. Now, for agent j,
yj = e
∗, and Ej(y) = yj + yi +
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
yk = e
∗ + 0 +
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
xk = e
∗,
by (32). Moreover we have that,
yk = xk = 0, and Ek(y) = yj +
∑
r∈Nk\{j}
yr ≥ e∗, ∀ k ∈ Nj\{i},
since yr ≥ 0 for all r, and for agent i,
yi = 0, and Ei(y) = yi + yj = e∗.
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Hence y satisfies all conditions in (EE(G)) whereby y is an equilibrium profile. Moreover, since yj =
e∗ = xj + xi,
Ek(y) = yj +
∑
r∈Nk\{j}
yr = xi + xj +
∑
r∈Nk\{j}
xr = Ek(x) + xi, ∀ k ∈ Nj\{i}. (34)
For agent i, since di = 1, and both x and y are equilibrium profiles, by Lemma 8(e), Ei(y) = Ei(x) = e∗.
Similarly since yj > 0 and xj > 0, Ej(y) = Ej(x) = e∗, due to (EE(G)).
To compare the cost of the equilibria y and x, observe that,
e>y = yi + yj +
∑
k 6=i,j
yk = e
∗ +
∑
k 6=i,j
xk = xi + xj +
∑
k 6=i,j
xk = e>x,
i.e., the total effort required by both equilibria y and x is the same. Hence we have,
WU(y)−WU(x) = b(Ei(y))− b(Ei(x)) + b(Ej(y))− b(Ej(x))+∑
k∈Nj\{i}
(b(Ek(y))− b(Ek(x))) +
∑
k/∈{j}∪Nj
b(Ek(y))− b(Ek(x))
(e)
= 0 + 0 +
∑
k∈Nj\{i}
(b(Ek(y))− b(Ek(x))) + 0 > 0,
where (e) follows since Ek(y) = Ek(x) for k /∈ {j} ∪Nj , Ei(y) = Ei(x) and Ej(y) = Ej(x). The inequality
follows from (34) and the monotonocity of b. This proves the claim.
The above theorem says that for a network with dependants, in a welfare maximizing equilibrium,
a pendant line cannot exist as a co-specialist link. However, in general, a similar substitution of efforts
amongst agents in a co-specialist pair does not lead to higher welfare, as demonstrated in Example 1.
The example shows an equilibrium where substitution of effort between co-specialist agents, which do
not form a dependant-guardian pair, yields lower welfare.
Example 1. (In general, substitution among co-specialists is inefficient)
In Figure 2, observe that in equilibrium (B) the agent on the top in the vertically oriented link substitutes
the effort of its co-specialist agent in equilibrium (A).
Let us now calculate the difference in the welfares of both the equilibria. By Lemma 10(c), since (B)
is a specialized equilibrium contained in the support of equilibrium (A), the cost of both equilibria is the
same, whereby the difference in the welfares of (A) and (B) is,
WU(A)−WU(B) = 2
(
b(1 +x) + b(2−x)− b(2)− b(1)) = 2x((b(1 + x)− b(1))
x
−
(
b(2)− b(2− x))
x
)
> 0.
The inequality above holds due to the identical lengths of intervals [1, 1 +x] and [2−x, 2] and due to the
concavity of the function b, by which the secant to b between (1, b(1)) and (x, b(x)) has a higher slope
than the secant between (2− x, b(2− x)) and (2, b(2)). Hence (A) yields higher welfare than (B). 
In proving Theorem 3, we need another result by Plummer et. al. [8] which characterizes well-covered
forest networks.
Theorem 14 (Plummer et. al. [8] Cor. 3.2) Let G be a forest network over n non-isolated vertices.
G is well-covered, if and only if, the pendant lines of G form a perfect matching. As a consequence
α(G) = β(G) = 12n.
Note that the above theorem means that for a forest without isolated vertices to be well-covered,
(i) every agent is either a dependant or a guardian and (ii) every guardian has exactly one dependant.
Hence the set of agents consists of n2 disjoint guardian-dependant pairs. This can be seen in Figure 4.
We will use this result to prove Theorem 3. Recall that we have to show that if a network of agents is a
well-covered forest, a welfare maximizing equilibrium is necessarily specialized.
Proof of Theorem 3
(a) If there exist isolated agents, they all exert effort e∗, i.e., they are specialists. In the rest of the
network without isolated agents, from Theorem 13 we know that if an equilibrium in a forest
20
network maximizes welfare, then in a dependant-guardian pair, exactly one agent is a specialist
whereby the other is a free rider. However, by Theorem 14, all the non-isolated agents in a well-
covered forest network exist as guardian-dependant pairs. Hence, all agents in a welfare maximizing
equilibrium are either specialists or free riders, i.e., the equilibrium is necessarily specialized. This
proves part (a).
(b) Let x be an equilibrium of the well-covered forest. We know from Theorem 7 that 1e∗x solves
LCP(G). SinceG is well-covered, α(G) = β(G). Also, sinceG is a forest min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} =
β(G) from Theorem 4(d). Thus we have from Theorem 4(b) that max{e>x | x solves LCP(G)} =
min{e>x | x solves LCP(G)}, whereby e>x is constant for all equilibria x, and takes the value
e∗α(G). Moreover, from Theorem 14, α(G) = 12n for well-covered forests G without isolated
agents. Hence the cost of every equilibrium is ce>x = ce∗α(G) = 12ce
∗n. This proves the claim. If
isolated agents are present, they exert effort e∗ and hence the cost incurred by each isolated agent
is ce∗.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the theory of public goods provision based on the model introduced by
Bramoulle and Kranton [2]. Our main results relate the structure of the network to its equilibria and
show that specialized equilibria enjoy many attractive properties. Specifically, we showed there exists a
specialized equilibrium whose welfare comes arbitrarily close to the maximum equilibrium welfare as the
concavity of the benefit function approaches unity, while for forest networks this holds true even as the
concavity approaches zero. More generally, for any network, there exists a specialized equilibrium which
maximizes total weighted equilibrium effort exerted by the agents. On forest networks they minimize the
total cost amongst all equilibria. This makes the case that the specialized equilibrium may be considered
as a refinement of the Nash equilibrium of a public goods game.
We further study the Nash equilibria of the public goods game in networks with dependants, i.e.,
agents adjacent to exactly one other agent, and show that they have a special structure, due to which
there always exists a free riding agent in every equilibrium. We also study a class of networks called
well-covered forests which possess the property that any welfare maximizing equilibrium is necessarily
specialized, and that every equilibrium in a public goods game over such a network incurs the same cost.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 8:
(a) Recall that a set S ⊆ V is said to be dominating if any vertex not in S has at least one neighbour
in S. From (EE(G)), we know that for an equilibrium x, we have Ei(x) ≥ e∗ for all agents i. An
agent i who is not a supporting agent is a free rider, i.e. xi = 0, whereby Ei(x) := xi +
∑
j∈Ni xj =∑
j∈Ni xj ≥ e∗, where Ni is the set of agents adjacent to i. Since all xj ≥ 0, there is at least one
neighbour of i who exerts positive effort, i.e., who is a supporting agent. This proves the claim.
(b) Let x be an equilibrium effort profile and let agent i∗ be a free rider, i.e., xi∗ = 0. At equilibrium
for every agent i, xi ≥ 0, Ei(x) ≥ e∗, and at least one inequality is tight. Observe that since i∗
is a free rider at equilibrium, it doesn’t contribute to the benefit of any agent in the network and
hence the effort of the closed neighbourhood Ei(x) for all agents other than i∗ remains the same
if i∗ left the network. Thus if y := x(−i∗), then for all i 6= i∗, yi = xi and Ei(y) = Ei(x). Thus
yi ≥ 0, Ei(y) ≥ e∗ and at least one inequality is tight whereby y is an equilibrium effort profile,
which proves the claim.
(c) If agent i is a specialist in an equilibrium with effort profile x, i.e., xi = e∗, and if it’s neighbour
j exerts an effort xj > 0, then Ei(x) ≥ xi + xj > e∗, which contradicts the third condition in
(EE(G)). Hence xj = 0 for all neighbours j of i, whereby any two agents who are specialists in
an equilibrium cannot be adjacent. Hence the specialists form an independent set. Note that this
need not be a maximal independent set.
(d) If agent i and j form a co-specialist pair in equilibrium with effort profile x, i.e., xi + xj = e∗.
If a neighbour k of agent i exerts positive effort xk > 0, then Ei(x) ≥ xi + xj + xk > e∗, which
contradicts (EE(G)). Hence xk = 0 for all neighbours of i and j which form a co-specialist pair.
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This means that for any two pairs of co-specialists in an equilibrium, there is no agent common to
the both pairs, whereby the co-specialist links form a matching of the network.
(e) Assume di > 0 for an agent i. If i is a free rider, observe that Ei(x) := xi+
∑
j∈Ni xj ≤ |Ni|e∗ = die∗,
where equality is attained only if all neighbours j ∈ Ni are specialists, which proves the third
inequality. On the other hand if i is not a free rider,then by (EE(G)) Ei(x) = e∗, whereby the
second inequality in (13) and its equality condition are proved. Finally, the first inequality in (13)
is tight if i is a specialist, which follows directly from the definition. However in this case, the
second inequality is also tight, since a specialist is not a free rider. If di = 0, then clearly the
agent’s effort in any equilibrium x is e∗ and Ei(x) = e∗.
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